Tuesday, 7 April 2026

Green Theology: Jesus and Animals

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Green Theology
Jesus and Animals

A cursory reading of the Gospels might well leave the impression that there is very little to be said about Jesus and animals. This impression would seem to be confirmed by the fact that modern New Testament scholarship, which has left rather few stones unturned in its detailed study of Jesus and the Gospels, has given virtually no attention to this subject. However, this chapter will show that there is in fact a good deal to be learned from the Gospels about Jesus’ understanding of the relationship between humans and other living creatures. This will only be possible by relating Jesus and his teaching to the Jewish religious tradition in which he belonged. All aspects of Jesus’ ministry and teaching, even the most innovatory, were significantly continuous with the Jewish tradition of faith, especially, of course, with the Hebrew Bible. Many features of this religious tradition Jesus presupposed. He did not argue, for example, that the God of Israel is the one true God, but everything he did and said presupposed this. Similarly, he presupposed the religious and ethical attitudes to animals that were traditional and accepted, both in the Old Testament and in later Jewish tradition. In his teaching, he adopts such attitudes, not for the most part in order to draw attention to them for their own sake, but in order to base on them teaching about the relation of humans to God. But this does not imply that he took them any the less seriously than other aspects of Jewish faith and religious teaching that he endorsed and developed.

But it does mean that, in order to appreciate the full implications of Jesus’ references to animals in his teaching, we must investigate the context of Jewish teaching to which they belong.

Compassionate Treatment of Animals

A duty to treat animals humanely and compassionately, not causing unnecessary suffering and whenever possible relieving suffering, was well established in Jewish tradition by Jesus’ time, though it was applied largely to domestic animals – those animals owned by humans as beasts of burden, working animals, sources of milk and food, and therefore also offered in sacrifices to God. These were the animals for which humans had day-to-day responsibility. They were not simply to be used and exploited for human benefit, but to be treated with respect and consideration as fellow-creatures of God.

Proverbs 12:10 states the general principle:

A right-minded person cares for his beast,

but one who is wicked is cruel at heart. (REB)

In later Jewish literature, an interesting instance is the Testament of Zebulon,[1] which is much concerned with the duty of compassion and mercy to all people, exemplified by the patriarch Zebulon himself, and understood as a reflection of the compassion and mercy of God.[2]

Compassion is probably here an interpretation of the commandment to love one’s neighbour (Lev. 19:18), taken to be the central and comprehensive ethical commandment of God and interpreted as requiring compassion for all people. In other words, the love commandment is interpreted much as Jesus interpreted it. But in Zebulon’s general statement of the ethical duty of compassion he extends it not only to all people but also to animals: ‘And now, my children, I tell you to keep the commands of the Lord: to show mercy to your neighbour, and to have compassion on all, not only human beings but also irrational animals. For on account of these things the Lord blessed me’ (T. Zeb. 5:1–2).

Another interesting, if not perhaps very representative, passage from the Jewish literature of Jesus’ time occurs in 2 Enoch (the Slavonic Apocalypse of Enoch) in a context of ethical teaching that again has many points of contact with the ethical teaching of Jesus. Chapters 58 – 59 deal with sins against animals. Uniquely, it teaches that the souls of animals will be kept alive until the last judgment, not, apparently, for the sake of eternal life for themselves,[3] but so that they may bring charges, at the last judgment, against human beings who have treated them badly (58:4–6). There seem to be three kinds of sins against animals: failing to feed domestic animals adequately (58:6),[4] bestiality[5] (59:5), and sacrificing an animal without binding it by its four legs (59:2–4). This third sin may seem at first sight to be purely a matter of not observing what the author understood to be the proper ritual requirements for sacrificial slaughter, and it is not obvious why it should be considered a sin against the animal. The reason may be that an animal not properly bound would struggle and die with unnecessary suffering. More probably, the idea is that if the animal struggled, the knife used to cut its throat might slip and damage the animal in some other way.[6] The animal would then not satisfy the ritual requirement that a sacrificial victim be without blemish, and could not be a valid sacrifice. In that case, its life would have been taken to no purpose. This passage of 2 Enoch is evidence that some Jews gave serious thought to human beings’ ethical duties towards animals.[7]

Of more direct relevance to material in the Gospels (as we shall see) are Jewish legal traditions, in which the law of Moses was interpreted as requiring compassion and consideration for animals. Later rabbinic traditions understood a whole series of laws in this way (Exod. 22:30; 23:4–5; Lev. 22:27,28; Deut. 22:1–4,6–7,10; 25:4).[8] In many of these cases, it is not obvious that the point of the law is compassion for the animals, and modern Old Testament exegetes often understand them differently.[9] Ancient Jews could also do so. For example, the law of Deuteronomy 22:6–7, which requires someone taking the young birds from a nest (for food) to let the mother bird go, was evidently understood (probably correctly) by the Jewish writer known as Pseudo- Phocylides (lines 84–5) as a conservation measure: ‘leave the mother bird behind, in order to get young from her again.’[10] But it was also commonly understood as a matter of compassion for the bird (Josephus, C. Ap. 2.213; Lev. Rab. 27:11; Deut. Rab. 6:1). The rabbis deduced from such laws a general principle that all living beings should be spared pain (the principle of a’ar ba’aley ayyim).[11] The rabbinic material, of course, post-dates the New Testament, but there are enough pieces of early evidence of the same kind of interpretation for us to be sure that this way of interpreting the law, as concerned with compassion for animals, was well established by Jesus’ time. For example, Josephus, in a remarkable passage in which he is trying to represent the law of Moses in the ways most calculated to appeal to Gentile critics of Judaism, explains that Moses required that the Jews

treat strangers and even national enemies with consideration, and then argues that Moses even required consideration for animals:

So thorough a lesson has he given us in gentleness and humanity that he does not overlook even the brute beasts, authorizing their use only in accordance with the Law, and forbidding all other employment of them [cf. Exod. 20:10; Deut. 5:14; 22:10]. Creatures which take refuge in our houses like suppliants we are forbidden to kill.[12] He would not suffer us to take the parent birds with the young [Deut. 22:6–7], and bade us even in an enemy’s country to spare and not to kill the beasts employed in labour [perhaps cf. Deut. 20:19]. Thus, in every particular, he had an eye to mercy, using the laws I have mentioned to enforce the lesson (C. Ap. 2.213–214).[13]

Here the principle of compassion for animals apparently leads to the formulation of laws not to be found in the written Torah at all. A very similar treatment, though restricted to laws actually found in the Torah, is given by Philo of Alexandria, who sees the gentleness and kindness of the precepts given by Moses in the fact that consideration is extended to creatures of every kind: to humans, even if they are strangers or enemies, to irrational animals,[14] even if they are unclean according to the dietary laws, and even to plants and trees (Virt. 160; cf. 81, 125, 140). He expounds in detail the laws which he understands to be motivated by compassion for animals: Leviticus 22:27 (Virt. 126–133); Leviticus 22:28 (134–142); Exodus 23:19; 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21 (142–144); Deuteronomy 25:4 (145); and Deuteronomy 22:10 (146–147).

This line of interpretation of the law cannot be explained merely as an apologetic for the law of Moses by diaspora Jews concerned to impress Gentiles. Not only can it be paralleled in later rabbinic literature. One striking instance, which may well go back to New Testament times, is found in the Palestinian Targum. It concerns the law of Leviticus 22:28, which forbids the slaughter of an animal and its young together (one of the laws discussed by Philo, though not by Josephus, as an instance of compassion for animals). According to the Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan, which frequently preserves Jewish exegetical traditions from the Second Temple period,[15] God, when giving this commandment, says to his people: ‘just as I in heaven am merciful, so shall you be merciful on earth’ (cf. Luke 6:36). Behind this statement probably lies Psalm 145:9: ‘The LORD is good to all, and his compassion is over all that he has made.’18 God’s compassion for all his creatures is to be imitated by his people, and the laws requiring consideration for animals are given to this end. The idea that compassion for animals is a general principle of the Torah explains why acts of compassion for animals were permitted on the Sabbath, even though they involved what would otherwise be considered work, which is prohibited on the Sabbath. On three occasions in the Gospels Jesus refers to such generally recognized exceptions to the prohibition of work on the Sabbath. He does so in the context of debate about his practice of performing healings on the Sabbath, to which the Pharisees (Matt. 12:10–14; Luke 14:3) and others (Luke 13:14; 14:3) objected. In each case his point is to argue that, since his opponents agreed that relieving the suffering of domestic animals was lawful on the Sabbath, how much more must relieving the suffering of human beings be lawful. The statements are:

Matthew 12:11–12: Suppose one of you has only one sheep and it falls into a pit on the sabbath; will you not lay hold of it and lift it out? How much more valuable is a human being than a sheep! So it is lawful to do good on the sabbath.

 

Luke 14:5: If one of you has a child19 or an ox that has fallen into a well, will you not immediately pull it out on a sabbath day?[16]

 

Luke 13:15–16: Does not each of you on the sabbath untie his ox or his donkey from the manger, and lead it away to give it water? And ought not this woman, a daughter of Abraham whom Satan bound for eighteen long years, be set free from this bondage on the sabbath day?

 

Not all Jews would have agreed with Jesus’ account of what it was permitted to do for animals on the Sabbath.[17] The written Torah, of course, makes no such explicit exceptions to the Sabbath commandment. Therefore the Qumran sect, whose interpretation of the Sabbath laws was extremely strict, categorically forbade such acts of mercy:

‘No man shall assist a beast to give birth on the Sabbath day. And if it should fall into a cistern or pit, he shall not lift it out on the Sabbath’ (CD 11:12–14).[18] On this latter question, addressed in Matthew 12:11 and Luke 14:5, later rabbinic opinion was divided as to whether it was permissible to help the animal out of the pit or only to bring it provisions until it could be rescued after the Sabbath (b. Shabb. 128b; b. B. Mets. 32b). We may take the Gospels as evidence that the more lenient ruling was widely held in Jesus’ time. As to the example given in Luke 13:15, it is very much in line with the Mishnah’s interpretation of Sabbath law in relation to domestic animals, though not explicitly stated as a rabbinic ruling. The point is that tying and untying knots were defined as two of the types of activity that constituted work and were generally unlawful on the Sabbath (m. Shabb. 7:2), but provision for domestic animals was one kind of reason for allowing exceptions (m. Shabb. 15:1–2; cf. b. Shabb. 128a–128b; cf. also m. Erub. 2:1–4, where it is taken for granted that cattle are watered on the Sabbath). These exceptions to the prohibition of work on the Sabbath are remarkable. They are not cases in which the lives of the animals were in danger, and so they cannot be understood as motivated by a concern to preserve the animals as valuable property. Rather they are acts of compassion, intended to prevent animal suffering. It was only because the law was understood as generally requiring considerate treatment of animals that the Sabbath commandment could be interpreted as not forbidding such acts of mercy to animals on the Sabbath.

Moreover, it is clear that Jesus understood the issue in this way. His argument is that, since his hearers agreed that acts of compassion, designed to relieve the suffering of animals, are lawful on the Sabbath, surely acts of compassion, designed to relieve human suffering, are also lawful. According to Matthew 12:12–13, rescuing a sheep from a pit on the Sabbath is ‘doing good’, and so healing a man’s withered hand on the Sabbath is also doing good.

Of course, in all three texts, the law’s requirement of compassion for animals is only the presupposition for the point Jesus is making. But his argument is certainly not merely ad hominem. He is arguing from a presupposition that is genuinely agreed between him and his opponents. Jesus, in his recorded teaching, does not teach compassion for animals, but he places himself clearly within the Jewish ethical and legal tradition that held that God requires his people to treat their fellow- creatures, the animals, with compassion and consideration.



[1] The majority scholarly opinion is that this, like the other Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, is an originally Jewish work, which has received some Christian editing. But the argument of H.W. Hollander and M. de Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary (SVTP 8; Leiden: Brill, 1985), pp. 82–5, that the Testaments as we have them are a Christian work, whose Jewish sources cannot be reconstructed, should also be noted.

[2] Hollander and De Jonge, Testaments, pp. 254–5.

[3] The point is not quite clear, because of the difference between the two recensions of the work: see the translations of 58:4–6 in manuscripts J and A in Francis I. Andersen, ‘2 (Slavonic Apocalypse of) Enoch’, in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 1 (ed. James H. Charlesworth; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983), pp. 184–5.

[4] This may also be the sin to which Pseudo-Phocylides 139 refers. Pieter W. van der Horst translates: ‘Take not for yourself a mortal beast’s ration of food.’ But the Greek is very obscure: see Pieter W. van der Horst, The Sentences of Pseudo- Phocylides (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 206. Cf. also b. Gitt. 62a; b. Ber. 40a.

[5] For this interpretation, see Andersen, ‘2 (Slavonic Apocalypse of) Enoch’, pp. 184–5 n. a. For Jewish  ondemnation of bestiality, see Exod. 22:18; Lev. 18:23; 20:15–16; Deut. 27:21; Philo, Spec. 3.43–50; Sib. Or. 5:393; T. Levi 17:11; Ps.-Phoc. 188; m. Sanh. 7:4; m. Ker. 1:1; m. ’Abod. Zar. 2:1; b. Yeb. 59b.

[6] Cf. Targums Pseudo-Jonathan and Neofiti to Gen. 22:10, where Isaac asks Abraham to bind him well for precisely this reason. I owe this point to Philip Alexander.

[7] It should be noted that the date and provenance of 2 Enoch are uncertain. I think it most likely to date from the late Second Temple period.

[8] See, e.g. b. Ber. 33b; b. B. Mets. 31a-32b, 87b; b. Shabb. 128b; Lev. Rab. 27:11; Deut. Rab. 6:1.

[9] For a recent discussion, see Murray, Cosmic Covenant, pp. 114–19.

[10] Van der Horst’s discussion (Sentences, pp. 172–3) seems to overlook the fact that the law is not here interpreted as a matter of kindness to the bird, as it is in other Jewish sources.

[11] Elijah Judah Schochet, Animal Life in Jewish Tradition (New York: Ktav, 1984), p. 151.

[12] This otherwise unknown law is also found in a lost work of Philo (Hypothetica), quoted in Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 8.7.

[13] Translation from Henry St John Thackeray, Josephus, vol. 1 (LCL; London: Heinemann/New York: Putnam, 1926), p. 379.

[14] Philo adopted the Stoic view that animals are distinguished from humans by their lack of reason. For Philo’s views of animals and his relationship on this point to Hellenistic philosophy, see Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus.

[15] For the probably early date of this particular tradition, see Martin McNamara, The New Testament and the Palestinian Targum to the Pentateuch (AnBib 27; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1966), pp. 136–7. It was later criticized and censured by rabbis who objected to the giving of reasons for commandments of the Torah, because this reduced the ordinances of God to mere acts of mercy: m. Ber. 5:3; b. Ber. 33b; y. Ber. 5,3,9c; y. Meg. 4,9,75c. See Efraim Elimelech Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), pp. 382–5, 452; Schochet, Animal Life, pp. 179–83; E. Segal, ‘Justice, Mercy and a Bird’s Nest,’ JJewishS 42 (1991): pp. 176–95.

[16] Matt. 12:11 and Luke 14:5 are probably variant forms of the same saying, though probably not derived by Matthew and Luke from the same source. Of course, Jesus could well have made the same point in the context of two debates about his practice of healing on the Sabbath.

[17] For differences in interpretation of the Sabbath law in New Testament times, see Ed P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah (London: SCM Press/ Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), pp. 6–23.

[18] Translation from Geza Vermes, The Dead Sea Scrolls in English (3rd edition; London: Penguin, 1987), p. 95.

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