What Are Some Other Arguments for God’s Existence?
From the early church onward, Christians have produced many rational and philosophical arguments for God’s existence as they reflected upon the world. This should not be surprising given the testimony of Romans 1:20, which reads, “His invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.”
We will review some additional arguments
that bear a strong witness to God. They will come primarily from Thomas Aquinas
(c. 1225–1274), who was not only one of the most prolific Christian authors in history,
but someone who gave an abundance of arguments for God. In the previous post we
looked at the classical forms of the cosmological, teleological, and moral
arguments; in this chapter, the goal is to present three additional arguments
that may not be as familiar.
Arguments for God’s Existence Argument from Motion
While several have provided an argument
from motion for a first unmoved mover, perhaps the best of these is found in
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, popularly known as the first of his Five
Ways and discussed in more length in his Summa contra Gentiles.[1] The argument is summarized
as follows:
1. It is evident to our senses that in
the world some things are in motion.
2. Everything put in motion is put in
motion by a mover.
3. There cannot be an infinite regress
of movers going backward. If there is no first mover, there can be no
subsequent motion.
4. Therefore, there is a first unmoved
mover; this is God.
Let us take a closer look at each part
of the argument.
1. It is evident to our senses that
in the world some things are in motion.
Aquinas strategically started from
motion observed in the world all around us. Local physical motion is the most
obvious, as when you move from place to place, but motion can also apply to
quantities or qualities, as when a plant grows larger or an apple becomes more
red.
2. Everything put in motion is put in
motion by a mover. This should not be surprising, for every change needs a
changer, and every effect needs a cause. When some potential to move is put
into motion, then that potential has been actualized. Prior to this, it only
had the potential (what can be) and needed another mover to bring about the
change in motion. Something cannot be potentially moving and actually moving in
the same respect. It is either one or the other. The consequences are that a potential
cannot actualize itself. There has to be something outside that potential, a
mover that is already actualized—that is, already existing. Even with created
composite self-movers such as animals and humans, one part moves another, for
no part can move itself. For example, the will moves the nerves, the nerves
fire the muscles, which moves the leg, which moves the body, etc. Even the
cognitive and volitional faculties of thinking or willing have not always
existed, for something prior to them needed to bring those faculties from mere
potentiality to actuality.
In addition, the potential of something
limits what kind of change is possible. For example, a block of stone has the
potential to be a statue, but not the potential to be an actual person. A
gallon-sized jug has the potential to hold one gallon of liquid, and once that
jug is full, then that potential has been actualized and no more potential
remains for additional liquid. Things in the natural world vary in their
mixture of potentiality and actuality. Some things have more potential for
motion or change than other things.
3. There cannot be an infinite
regress of movers going backward. If there is no first mover, there can be no
subsequent motion. If every potential to move or change needed something
actual, and if what was actual at one time was in potential, then it also
needed something prior that was actual, and so on. Aquinas reasons that this
cannot go on infinitely backward (infinite regress). Each potential that has
been actualized required something prior to bring about the change. If
something went infinitely backward, then it would not have a beginning, as you
cannot reach the edge of an infinite. Aquinas emphasized that there has to be a
first mover to get the motion started. If there is no first actualizer, there
can be no subsequent motion.
Some have been confused on how this
might relate to Newton’s first law, which says, “Every body perseveres in its
state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar
as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.”[2] That is, a body that is at
rest or in motion tends to stay in that state unless acted on by another.
However, this does not negatively affect the basic principle of Aquinas’s first
way. For whatever is moved is moved by another, and whatever is changed needs a
changer, just as every effect needs a cause. Newton’s law in fact supports that
there needs to be something to cause the body to change from a state of rest to
a state of motion or vice versa. Aquinas’s argument does not conflict with
this, as his argument was interested in what brought about the first motion.
The alternative is that there is eternal motion, but that cannot be, as there
cannot be an infinite regress of prior changes. Nor can there be some reciprocal
or cyclical eternal causality, such as one thing, B1, causes another, B2, which
in turn causes a change back on B1 infinitely backward.
There still needs to be an accounting of
the first movement, since motion, as a series of changes, cannot go back
infinitely. If it did, then the infinite number of changes could not be crossed
to arrive at the present and current change. Hence, an infinite regress is
impossible.
4. Therefore, there is a first
unmoved mover; this is God. Tracing the motion to its source, Aquinas
arrived at a first unmoved mover that is needed to account for all subsequent
motion. This is God. God has no beginning, and nothing else actualized Him. God
has always existed (Psalm 90:2). Neither can God change, for He has no
potential to change (Malachi 3:6). Therefore, God is pure actuality and the
first unmoved mover. God is the great “I am” (Exodus 3:14), who gave motion to
everything else.
Argument from Contingency
Another argument provided by Aquinas in Summa
Theologiae Ia.2.3 is known as his third way. It was an argument from
contingency to necessity.
1. Contingent (dependent) beings exist
(e.g., I am a contingent being).
2. A contingent being needs a cause for
its existence.
3. An infinite regress (going backward
infinitely) of contingent causes is impossible.
4. Neither can one contingent being
cause another contingent being.
5. Therefore, there must be a Necessary
Being that is the cause of every contingent being. This is God.
This is a shortened and slightly
reformulated form of the argument. To understand the connection further, let us
go through each part of the argument.
1. Contingent beings exist (e.g., I
am a contingent being). In nature we find beings that begin and cease to
exist; these are known as possible or contingent beings. These are not
self-existent beings. In other words, they do not have existence by nature, for
if they did, then they would have always existed. Human beings are an example
of a contingent being. We do not have existence by nature and have not always
existed. Our existence is dependent upon another, and this cannot be our
parents. Our parents are only the instrumental cause (i.e., the instrument
through which) of our becoming, but not the cause sustaining us in existence.
Why? Every effect needs a cause, and if you remove the cause, then the effect
does not follow.
If our parents were the primary single
cause, then when they died, we (the effect) would cease also. But when parents
die, their children remain. The same is true of the blacksmith with his hammer,
for he is only the cause of the becoming of horseshoes. When the blacksmith
passes away, the horseshoes remain. This is because there is another cause
sustaining them in their being.
2. A contingent being needs a cause
for its existence. A contingent
(dependent) being is a being that came
to be, and can cease to be. Whatever begins to exist does so only through what
already exists. Consequently, a contingent being needs a cause for its
existence. It cannot cause itself, for then it would be prior to itself, which
is absurd. Something else had to bring it into existence.
3. An infinite regress of contingent
causes is impossible. There cannot be an infinite regress, because an
infinite cannot be crossed—that is, you cannot get to the other side of it.
Moreover, adding more contingent beings to the series does not get rid of the
contingency, because the whole thing is still contingent, and needs a cause for
its existence.
4. Neither can one contingent being
cause another contingent being. Consequently, a contingent being cannot be
the primary cause of another contingent being to exist, for a being cannot give
what it does not have essentially. If a being is contingent, then it does not
have its own existence to give. Imagine several people lined up to pay for
admission tickets at the entrance of a movie theatre. When the cashier asks the
first person for money, that person—and all the others—points to the person
behind him and says, “My friend will pay.” Then the last person in line becomes
exasperated and says, “I don’t have any money.” None of the people earlier in
line have money to give, just as none of the prior contingent beings have existence
of their own to give. Here’s another way to think about this: I only contingent
beings existed, then there would be nothing to explain or be the ground of
their existence. Simply adding more contingent beings never provides the basis
for existence.
5. Therefore, there must be a
Necessary Being that is the cause of every contingent being. This is God.
The fact that some contingent beings exist means that something must have
always existed, for if there ever was a time when there was absolutely nothing,
then there would have always bee nothing. Consequently, there must be a
Necessary Being whose essence it is to exist and is the primary cause of
existence for all contingent beings. This is God. The question for the atheist
is this: Why is there something in existence rather than nothing at all? The
reason is that there is a God who brought all things into being. Stated in
terms of dependency for the
universe, the sequence would look
something like this:[3]
1. Every part of the universe is
dependent.
2. If every part is dependent, then the
whole universe must also be
dependent.
3. Therefore, the whole universe is
dependent for existence right now on some independent being—namely, God.
Adding more dependent (or contingent)
beings can never remove the dependency. You have to continue back to something
that is necessary, something whose nature it is to exist. This is God. In
theology proper (the study of God’s attributes), the term aseity (Latin,
“of oneself”) is used to denote this most amazing truth that God is
self-existent (Genesis 1:1; Exodus 3:14; Psalm 90:2; John 1:1; Romans 11:36;
Colossians 1:17).
Argument from Perfection
In his fourth way, Aquinas provided an
argument from the gradations of things to a most perfect being (Summa
Theologiae Ia.2.3), as did an earlier theologian by the name of Anselm of
Canterbury (1033–1109) in his Monologium.[4]Taking the best of these
both produces the following argument for God’s perfection:
1. We observe that some beings are more
nearly perfect than others.
2. The cause of this perfection is
either one or many.
3. If there were many, there would be no
way to compare their perfection, but some things are more perfect than others.
4. Moreover, things cannot be more or
less perfect unless there is one wholly perfect source and standard for
comparison.
5. Therefore, there must be a most
perfect being who is the source of all perfections. This is God.
Several points can be made about each
premise.
1. We observe that some beings are
more nearly perfect than others. As we live, we make comparisons every day
with regard to the objects around us to determine what to buy or sell, whom to
marry, and so on. And when we do, we find that some things are more or less
perfect, noble, true, or good than others.
2. The cause of this perfection is
either one or many. When thinking
about what causes these perfections, it
seems natural to inquire whether one or more things cause them. The other
option is to say there were no causes, which is impossible given that an effect
cannot arise without a cause (the law of causality). All perfections in
contingent beings need a cause, a source from which they came.
3. If there were many, there would be
no way to compare their
perfection, but some things are more
perfect than others. When we are unable
to easily compare things in a practical way, we say, “It is like comparing
apples and oranges.” Yet Aquinas was not referring to practical or utilitarian
comparisons. As we compare things, especially across categories, we may begin
to realize that we are comparing them at a more fundamental level. Aquinas was
referring to a comparison of their quality of being because trueness,
nobility, goodness, beauty, and perfection transcend physical and material
categories.
For example, a man approaches these
qualities of being more than a stone, and a being that has intelligence is
better than a being that does not. So regardless of type, the thing that
approaches perfection will exhibit more of these transcendent qualities.
Another way to think about this is to imagine the result if perfections were
removed. If you remove all the perfections from something, what are you left
with? You would be left with nothing (nonbeing). If you have a totally
moth-eaten shirt, you have no shirt at all. However, if you remove all the
imperfections of something, what are you left with? You are left with something
perfect (being). Therefore, when a thing is more perfect, it approaches the
perfection of the pureness of being itself (pure actuality).
4. Moreover, things cannot be more or
less perfect unless there is one wholly perfect source and standard for
comparison. Observing that some things are better than others requires an
objective standard by which to make the comparison—just as that which is hotter
than another more nearly approaches that which is hottest. In terms of
causation, an effect derives its perfection from its cause, for an effect
cannot be greater than its cause. A cause cannot give what it does not have,
but what it does have can be given to the effect. Hence, if some effects are
more perfect than others, then they must be caused by a source of perfection.
5. Therefore, there must be a most
perfect being who is the source of all perfections. This is God. As Aquinas eloquently stated in his
fourth way, there needs to be a perfect being who is the source of all
perfections (Matthew 5:48):
So that there is something which is
truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is
uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being…Therefore
there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and every other
perfection; and this we call God.[5]
The Value of Knowing the Arguments
for God’s Existence
There are many arguments for God
available in the sources written across the ages of church history. This brief
treatment is only a tiny fraction of what has been written on the subject. It
is strongly encourage you to explore the other arguments more fully, as they
can be edifying and can contribute to strengthening your faith. They can also
be strategically used when you share your faith, as you are likely to encounter
questions or alternative viewpoints regarding God’s existence. By becoming
familiar with the various rational arguments, you can use them to remove
objections others
may have toward the gospel. This does
not necessarily mean quoting the arguments mechanically in their raw form.
Instead, it means knowing the essence and truth of the arguments, then
utilizing them strategically in conversational language.
[1] Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas
Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN:
Christian Classics, 1981), Ia.2.3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles,
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London, UK: Burns Oates &
Washbourne, 1924), I.13.
[2] Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy: The Authoritative Translation, trans. I.
Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 1999), Kindle loc. 76.
[3] Norman L. Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 1
(Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 30.
[4] Anselm, Basic Writings, ed. and trans. Thomas
Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2007).
[5] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia.2.3