thE FUTURE PHILOSOPHY
This is a discussion of trends and that may arise out of the trends and is not intended to be predictive.The possibilities are not intended to be mutually exclusive.
It is not implied that the
“highest” possibilities for philosophy will or should arise out of recent
trends; rather there may be a return to high points of the past as a start or
there may be a synthesis of various ideas from philosophy and other disciplines
from various times and imagination and new forms of criticism; or, there may be
a complete break…
1.1 Philosophical
nihilism
“Philosophical nihilism”
refers to those trends, influential in the recent period, in which it is
problematic to make positive statements in philosophy. “Positive” simply means
an assertion about the way the world is – there is no reference to any kind of
positivism. There is a way, of course, in which it must be problematic to make
assertions about the way the world is – without that there would be no critical
function within philosophy. However, the problematic aspect of recent
philosophy does not concern the truth or knowledge / knowability status of
assertions; it concerns whether such statements can be validly made, whether
they have meaning, whether they are at all the business of philosophy. The
trends are characterized by a number of the themes noted in the section The effect on philosophy
and include: despair of construction, isolation of the schools, surrealism of
recent philosophy, philosophy as edifying, as therapeutic, philosophy as an
adjunct to the mature disciplines – especially the sciences; and philosophy as
analytic – as unable to say anything about the world
The influences include the
turning of the rational approach that characterized the modern period upon
itself – subjecting rationality and rationalism to rational criticism; by
various pluralisms and relativisms – of cultures and sub-cultures, of
proliferation of academic disciplines, of the special interest; the rise of
science; the rise of democratic systems of election of governments – that
contributes to pluralist influence; the fall of ideological systems of
government; the rise of capitalism as an ideology
[I should not be construed
as being against democracy. However, knowledge as relation to the world is
characterized primarily by validity and not by populism. I should not be
construed as being for non-democratic rule or as suggesting that ‘elitism’ or
other non-populist sentiments promote validity in knowledge and understanding.
Simply, however, there are times, places and sub-cultures when and where,
perhaps despite politics, the issue of validity was understood and respected.
In modern times it is not democracy that stands against validity, instead it is
factors such as the assertion of ego over validity rather than channeling ego
into validity, the false appeal to populism and humility – ego wearing a humble
face, the loss of nerve, the dilution of validity under the ever increasing
modern academic pressure to publish and produce, the pressure of dogmatic and
anti-democratic forces…]
Some diverse movements that
reflect this nihilist trend are: the Anti-Realist Trends and Tendencies in 20th
Century Philosophy – including Deconstructionism; and Materialism, Positivism, Post Marxism, Postmodernism,
Post-Structuralism.
I have included materialism and positivism as “nihilist” not because they deny
so much but, rather, because by making extravagant and empty claims they cast
doubt on the ability to make any positive claims
Although I stand against the
stream that I call philosophical nihilism, there is no suggestion that the
criticism of rationality and rationalism is not an instructive activity. The
criticism of rationality shows not only limits but is also a critique of the
nature of rationality; if the criticism has misunderstood the nature of reason
– and that may be because the proponents of reason have also misunderstood its
true nature and possibilities – then the criticism itself is also in doubt but
has at the same time pointed to a new concept of reason. There is no suggestion
that there is nothing positive about the various effects and movements in the
stream; clearly, much has been discovered and learned from the analytic
tradition and also from postmodernism and post-structuralism
A movement or trend within
philosophy can always be defended, in addition to arguments in its favor, by arguing
or positing that “the essence of this trend is philosophy.” Cogent
arguments that outline the scope of any discipline are only one influence on
what that discipline is [taken to be.] Specifying the scope of a discipline is
not exactly the same as making a factual statement. This is because a
discipline is a cultural activity and is therefore open, in part, to
proscription – as a concept. Therefore, the endeavor to pin down “what is
philosophy?” is a valid activity. However, philosophy also exists as a family
of activities and the [family of] concepts will bear some real relation to the
activity in its actual and potential forms
1.2 The
obligations and needs of philosophy
The tradition of philosophy is that it is an intellectual pursuit. Question this – as an experiment, say. Intellectual activity in a vacuum has no significance. Even for an ‘armchair’ thinker, experience provides data and confirmation or disconfirmation, and the experience of the thinker grows in interaction with the thinking and the growth of thought. ‘Pure’ experience and ‘pure’ thought – these concepts are approximations – require each other. Although experience and thought are not identical, they are not separate, and there is a stage of development or of evolution where they are identical in their origin. As experience and reflection acquire degrees of distinction, they become more elaborate in their nature [structure-process] and definite in character, and become thought of as distinct. However, the distinction does not become complete. Thus, regardless of the conceptions, there is no pure thought, no pure intellect, no pure philosophy if philosophy is a purely intellectual exercise. There is a simple reply to this. It is that thought and experience both find [re]presentation within philosophy, within thought itself. However, this is another thought that requires confirmation/disconfirmation [testing] in experience; and thought itself informs us that it is actual experience but not all possible or all future experience that is represented in thought. The essential incompleteness of thought, of rationality and rationalism, informs us that while philosophy as an intellectual pursuit is a valid activity – based in cumulative experience, there is a larger realm in which philosophy is bound together with action and the rest of the knowledge enterprise. Knowledge, thought, and philosophy are an active phase of experience. This line of thinking was begun in A Concept of Philosophy, was required by the experience of the essential incompleteness of thought, and is continued in Journey in Being, below
It remains true that the
tradition of philosophy is that of an intellectual discipline – or set of
disciplines. ‘Discipline’ is not identical to method or criticism; the approach
is open with ‘local methods’ being discovered or modified as part of the
activity; and criticism is part of a larger activity that includes hypothesis
or imagination – without new ideas there is nothing to criticize
Academic philosophy is
intellectual but not all intellectual activity under the banner of philosophy
is academic. Of course, there is ‘poor’ philosophy but that is not the point;
the history of ideas reveals that a significant proportion of the truly great
original concepts and thoughts – in philosophy and in science – occurred
outside the walls of academe. “Academe” itself is not a perfectly well defined
concept; we could replace “academic philosophy” or “academic science” by “institutional
philosophy or science;” these are community pursuits, sanctioned, roughly
correspond to a Kuhnian paradigm. In the beginning, philosophy and science were
not paradigmatic; and, in periods of upheaval, they are not paradigmatic. There
is a tendency for the non-paradigmatic activities to occur outside academia.
Perhaps this has changed in the 20th century – as a result of the
greater freedoms within university environments. It remains true that, in
principle, not all good and certainly not all revolutionary thought is academic
thought. Any identity of academic and extra-academic thought is contingent but not
conceptual or necessary
The first obligation of
academic philosophy is to the tradition and that includes philosophy as a kind
of intellectual activity. The obligations of which I talk are de facto
rather than conceptual or even ethical. One may or may not feel that current
philosophy owes anything to the tradition but the fact is that most philosophy
is and will be conducted in the shadow of the tradition. Part of this
continuity is the requirement of the recognition of an activity as philosophy;
part is a result of the needs of communication; and another part is the
difficulty of self-foundation
The second de facto
obligation of academic philosophy is to society, to culture. There is an
obligation to the traditional assumptions of the culture: to rationalize into
coordination the different modes, institutions and norms of oculture, knowledge
and understanding. The obligation is met as much by criticism and search for
alternatives as it is by justification and affirmation. Criticism provides a
more secure form of affirmation. Perhaps we would justify certain social
structures or economic environments; these activities may be considered to be
social science or economics. At one time they were philosophy; it remains true
that social science and economics are not completely independent or
self-founding and activity in these areas may be validly labeled philosophy
regardless of who is the executor. Each culture has general metaphysical
assumptions that are to some degree embodied in the common symbols of the
culture. The modern world eschews myth and religion; in other cultures, e.g.
the medieval west, myth and religion were part of the common metaphysical
symbols and much of medieval philosophy – scholasticism – was devoted to a
justification of religion. In the modern world much of philosophy is reflective
of and an implicit justification of secularism and pluralism; there are
exceptions and these also serve to affirm or disaffirm the common pluralistic
and secular metaphysics that disavows fundamental or systematic metaphysics.
Iconoclasts and conservatives serve under the shadow of the tradition
The third obligation of
academic philosophy is to the intellectual tradition and that includes the
developments of the current era. This third obligation is a phase of and occurs
within the context of the second. Academic philosophy bears some relation to
its own history and to the other academic disciplines. An explanation of the ‘nihilist’
trend is given above. It is possible within this trend to make positive
contributions. First, through the analysis of philosophy. Here the analytic
tradition makes a significant contribution through new conceptions of
philosophy and its ways [method] – the analysis of language and concepts; the
Wittgensteinian approach of lateral analysis as foundational. Regardless of
whether this defines philosophy, it is an accomplishment, reveals new
understanding, defines a phase of philosophy; it is a somewhat introspective
phase – perhaps characterized by a degree of sophistry – from which all of
philosophy and thought may emerge ‘improved.’ Second, through the
various movements such as pragmatism, existentialism, postmodernism that have
origins in
A fourth obligation,
somewhat ethical in nature, is to philosophy as such: to philosophy as the human
intellectual endeavor that seeks ultimate [human] understanding and knowledge
Now there are and have been
various conceptions of philosophy and various problems associated with the idea
of a conception of the philosophical endeavor – The history and nature of philosophy: Thales to the
modern period, above. Specified meanings range from original
[etymological] “love of wisdom,” to the modern – philosophy as analysis,
philosophy as an adjunct edifying activity [Rorty], as edifying [Wittgenstein],
as grammar [Wittgenstein] and so on. As noted above, the relation between a
specification or a specified designation and the phenomenon, activity or
discipline of philosophy is tenuous – this is, of course, true of many human endeavors.
Philosophy has taken on a life of its own and though there are surely various
kinds of relation between the phenomenon and the attempts to characterize and
circumscribe the phenomenon, the relation is not one where the prescription
comes first and the activity follows the prescription. The nature of the
activity varies, somewhat, according to the age and the needs of the age.
Definitions bear some relation to this variation but also to the personalities
involved and other, including accidental, factors. The definition of philosophy
may aspire to be but is not a purely rational or empirical activity. One view
of the various attempts to characterize philosophy is that they are various
viewpoints or ‘windows,’ that they help orient newcomers and provide regulation
– navigation – for ‘old hands.’ Or, the characterizations are in fact, rather
than actually characterizing or defining, a form of
implicit dialectic among the philosophers. Some contributions to
the dialectic, as philosophy unfolds, inspire more good [philosophy] than
others. However, no specification can rule conduct forever – simply because
specifications cannot foresee all needs and eventualities. Wittgenstein would
have made this observation, it is entirely consistent with his later philosophy
of meaning. What can we do in this circumstance? First, we can note that some
meanings are more general – are umbrella meanings. This is true of the
original, Greek philein, to love – sophia, wisdom. With regard to
such an umbrella meaning we can take the following attitudes. [1] It specifies
a whole range of activity. [2] Criticism need not lead to specialization but
may also lead to refinement. [3] Various offshoots and disciplines may be
considered to lie within the scope of the ‘parent’ or umbrella activity. But,
[4] there is a need for the most general activity, and a recognition [naming]
of it. What shall we call that most general activity, what shall it be? We
could call it Universal Studies, we could leave it unnamed – the province of
academe or of the University; but, philosophy is the name that –perhaps– best
matches and fits in to the tradition. What we lose in precision is gained in
vision, scope and destiny. Shall we not travel where the light is not bright
and focus not precise? The disciplines of the modern university have a
pragmatic base but also correspond to the rooms where the bright light is on,
where light travels in straight lines. Philosophy is not just the other rooms
or all the rooms – it is the mansion. We shall play under the following
paradigm or conception: philosophy is the entire edifice, the intellectual
endeavor that seeks ultimate understanding and knowledge
Think of the implications of
that task. It is not an uncritical endeavor and the roots of criticism lie
within the specification itself. Ultimate understanding comes from confidence
and, therefore, from criticism. But, as noted above, criticism requires
something to criticize. Ultimate understanding – and criticism – will also come
from the ultimate scope of knowledge: empirical and rational. By rational, I
mean that which has origin in thought including imaginative thought. The
approach through the senses lies in balance with the approach through thought –
a phase of active experience – and it is in the nature of being to synthesize
the two. It is only in analysis that sense and thought are thought of as
separate; another Western cut as fruitful and as problematic as the Cartesian
divide. The origin of thought, biologically and in evolution, is in the ability
to have, remember and play with remembered images – and to construct new ones.
Thought and concepts are a framework for experience; experience and criticism ‘found’
thought
What are the dimensions of
ultimate understanding? These come from experience and thought. The world as a
whole and the place of [human] being; the origins and destinies; the categories
or hierarchies of being and of understanding
We will see, below, that this conception or idea of philosophy, the intellectual endeavor that seeks ultimate understanding and knowledge, is preliminary.
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