Philosophy in the Roman World
Everyone who lived in the world that produced the New Testament was influenced directly or indirectly by different patterns of thought that the Greeks and Romans brought to the lands that they subdued and occupied. The people of this era were heirs to the three greatest Greek philosophers—Socrates (ca. 470– ca. 399 BCE), Plato (ca. 428–ca. 348 BCE), and Aristotle (384–322 BCE)—and to some extent the thinking of most people was shaped by what these masters had taught. Indeed, the case could be made that the thinking of most people today is still shaped by the ideas expounded and explored by these influential thinkers.
New Testament scholars focus more
attention, however, on certain philosophical movements that were popular during
the period in which the New Testament documents were written. These include the
following:
· Cynicism—a philosophical orientation that emphasized radical
authenticity, repudiation of shame, simplicity of lifestyle, and a desire to
possess only what is obtained naturally and freely.
· Epicureanism—a philosophical orientation that emphasized free will,
questioned fate, and encouraged the attainment of true pleasure through
avoidance of anxiety, concentration on the present, and enjoyment of all things
in moderation.
· Platonism—a philosophical orientation that emphasized the reality of a
transcendent world of “ideals” standing behind everything physical or earthly.
· Pythagoreanism—a philosophical orientation that emphasized the value of
intelligent reasoning, memory, and radical honesty, all in service of a quest
to attain harmony of ideas and of body and soul.
· Stoicism—a philosophical orientation that emphasized the attainment of
virtue through acceptance of fate, based on the notion that all things are
predetermined and that there is logic to all that transpires.
New Testament scholars detect the influence of these philosophical schools in various ways. Paul is depicted as interacting with Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in Acts 17:16–34, but the impact of Greek and Roman philosophy can be detected even when there is no reason to suspect direct contact. Josephus, a first-century Jewish Roman historian, thought that the Essenes (who produced the Dead Sea Scrolls) were analogous to Pythagoreans and that the Pharisees had much in common with Stoics. Likewise, many modern scholars have noted similarities between the first followers of Jesus and Cynic philosophers (e.g., in their renunciation of materialism and worldly status). Several letters in the New Testament (including 1 Corinthians, Galatians, and James) make use of the “diatribe” and other forms of rhetorical argument that were popular among Cynic and Stoic philosophers. The Letter to the Hebrews is often read as an engagement with Platonic philosophy, and the concept of the “Logos” in John 1:1–18 also
owes much to that school of thought.
The “banquet talks” that Jesus gives in Luke’s Gospel (7:44–46; 14:7– 14) and the lengthy discourses that he offers in the Gospel
of John (5:19–47; 6:25–70; 7:14–52; 8:12–59; 10:1–18, 22–39; 12:23–36; 14:1–16:33) are similar in style and content to writings of
various philosophical schools.
Of course, not everyone in the Roman world would have identified as a follower of one of these particular schools. Jewish peasants in Palestine may not have known one system from another. Still, these philosophies represent the sort of thinking that was “in the air” at the time. They represent efforts to answer questions that virtually everyone wondered about: What is the purpose or goal or highest good in life? Is everything predetermined, or can people make choices that affect how their lives turn out? Is there life beyond death? What is the secret of happiness? Even uneducated people in far-flung corners of the empire (e.g., Galilean fishermen or shepherds or carpenters) tended to think about things like this and to orient themselves in amanner more compatible with one philosophical system than with others. Naturally, people then (as now) could also be eclectic and inconsistent, simultaneously holding to notions derived from schools that the philosophers themselves might not have considered compatible.
